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We explored how individuals at-risk for HD who have or have not been tested make repro-
ductive decisions and what factors are involved. We interviewed 21 individuals (8 with and
4 without the mutation, and 9 un-tested) in-depth for 2 hours each. At-risk individuals faced
a difficult series of dilemmas of whether to: get pregnant and deliver, have fetal testing, have
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, adopt, or have no children. These individuals weighed
competing desires and concerns: their own desires vs. those of spouses vs. broader moral con-
cerns (e.g., to end the disease; and/or follow dictates against abortion) vs. perceptions of the
interests of current or future offspring. Quandaries arose of how much and to whom to feel
responsible. Some changed their perspectives over time (e.g., first “gambling,” then being
more cautious). These data have critical implications for genetic counselors and other health
care workers and future research, particularly as more genetic tests become available.
KEY WORDS: reproductive choices; genetics; pre-implantation genetic diagnosis; ethics; decision-
making; risk assessments; qualitative research.
INTRODUCTION
After the location of the Huntington’s Disease
(HD) gene was identified, many at-risk individuals
suggested that they would utilize prenatal testing
(Craufurd et al., 1989; Kessler et al., 1987; Markel
et al., 1987; Mastromauro et al., 1987; Meissen and
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Berchek, 1987; Tyler et al., 1990), yet fewer have
done so (Evers-Kierbooms et al., 2002). Prenatal test-
ing for HD, using amniocentesis or chorionic villus
sampling (CVS) of a fetus has been possible, fol-
lowed by a choice of whether to continue or termi-
nate the pregnancy. More recently, disclosing and
non-disclosing preimplantation genetic diagnosis for
HD have also been developed (Sermon et al., 2002;
Simpson and Harper, 2001), in which mutation neg-
ative embryos are implanted in the uterus, either
with or without patients’ knowledge of their own HD
genetic status. Patients who do not wish to know
their own gene status are thus able to assure that
any viable pregnancy is mutation negative (Stern
et al., 2002), while not learning their own gene status.
Yet patients have found the treatment cycle of pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis to be stressful (Lavery
et al., 2002).
Studies have suggested that individuals not at
risk for HD have thought that at-risk individuals
should prevent transmitting HD to offspring. For
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example, of Swiss law and medical students, 94%
support the systematic proposal of prenatal testing
for at-risk pregnant individuals (Elger and Harding,
2003). Of Mexican neurologists, psychiatrists, and
psychologists, 38% thought that mutation positive in-
dividuals should not have offspring (Alonso Vilatela
et al., 1999), though this study did not consider
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. A study in 3
European countries found that most geneticists, ob-
stetricians, lay individuals, and pregnant women
would undergo an abortion of a fetus with the HD
mutation (Drake et al., 1996)
However, in the past decade, rates of prena-
tal testing among at-risk populations have also been
found to be relatively low − 5–25% in the United
Kingdom (Hayden, 2000) and Australia (Richards
and Rea, 2005), and approximately 18% in Canada
(Creighton et al., 2003). In a French study of cou-
ples pregnant at the time of presymptomatic testing,
73% opted to continue the pregnancy, and only 9%
opted for prenatal testing (Lesca et al., 2002). Women
more than men have been found to undergo pre-
dictive testing for themselves and to request prena-
tal testing (Creighton et al., 2003; Richards and Rea,
2005).
Many individuals at risk for HD have decided to
have children, though they may carry the mutation.
In the Netherlands, e.g., 19% of at-risk individuals
have had genetic testing done and 44% of these
already had children (Maat-Kievit et al., 1999). Com-
pared to HD non-carriers, HD carriers may have
approximately equal or fewer numbers of subse-
quent pregnancies (Taylor and Myers, 1997; Goizet
et al., 2002). In Europe, Evers-Kiebooms et al. (2002),
e.g., found that 14% of HD carriers vs. 28% of non-
carriers had later pregnancies. Among carriers, pre-
natal diagnosis did not occur in one-third of pregnan-
cies. Among those who were motivated by “family
planning” to get predictive testing, 39% of carriers
vs. 69% of non-carriers had subsequent pregnancies
(Evers-Kiebooms et al., 2002). Thus, test results
may predict pregnancy decisions, although differ-
ences may arise between countries.
Possible reasons reported for low uptake of pre-
natal testing include: objections to abortion, hope
that a cure will be found, psychological defense
mechanisms, and desires to seek first predictive test-
ing for the parent (Adam et al., 1993; Richards and
Rea, 2005). Of note, these Australian and Canadian
reports did not mention cost as a potential barrier.
Ethical questions exist as to what traits should be
screened for using pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
or other prenatal procedures, to avoid “unacceptable
consumerism” (Henn, 2000). Controversy exists
about embryo selection based on sex or inheri-
table deafness (Robertson, 2003). Non-disclosure
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis presents certain
ethical challenges, given that egg extraction is not en-
tirely benign, and a large team of health care work-
ers is involved in pre-implantation genetic diagno-
sis, challenging the maintenance of confidentiality.
Due to these potential problems, at least one HD
clinic at one time did not offer non-disclosure pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (Braude et al., 1998).
Yet, how at-risk individuals actually view these issues
has not been examined.
Downing (2005) emphasizes the importance of
responsibility toward others as a factor in repro-
ductive decision-making about HD. But other con-
cerns may arise as well. Indeed, Downing’s data
involved testing through linkage analyses that neces-
sitate families acting together to arrange for prenatal
testing (Downing, 2005). However, technology now
has advanced to allow direct testing for the muta-
tion. Moreover, Downing presents 3 cases, but addi-
tional scenarios and conflicts may arise among other
individuals.
A Health Belief Model has been described, sug-
gesting that individuals’ health behavior is shaped by
their perceived susceptibility, disease severity, and
costs and benefits of the behavior (Rosenstock et al.,
1988). Such a model has not been explored with re-
gard to HD reproductive decisions, but may offer in-
sights. With regard to decisions about genetic testing
for HD, Stages of Change models have also been sug-
gested: e.g., that individuals enter a precontemplative
phase (Houlihan, 1999; Taylor, 2005). With regard
to HD reproductive decisions, individuals may in-
deed undergo a process, including precontemplation
stages as well. Yet what exactly occurs during these
stages remains unclear. Stages of change models as
a whole have been criticized, since individuals may
occupy several such stages simultaneously (Littell
and Girvin, 2002), yet the possible applicability of
such a theoretical model may be worth exploring
with regard to HD reproductive decision-making. In-
dividuals may face conflicts and have to balance de-
sires to appear and act altruistically and responsibly
toward others vs. wishes to follow their own needs.
In general (i.e., without regard to any particu-
lar disorders), genetic counseling has been found to
affect 43.5% of clients’ decisions about reproductive
options (Wertz and Sorenson, 1986). But in these de-
cisions, influence by others (e.g., spouses and other
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health care workers) has been under-examined.
Indeed, family members often feel stress when an in-
dividual is diagnosed with HD (Sobel and Cowan,
2000). In general, couples often disagree on reasons
for genetic counseling, both before and afterwards
(Sorenson and Wertz, 1986), and genetic testing can
have complex effects on a relationship (Richards,
2004). Relationship factors have been found to affect
abortion decisions (Sihvro et al., 2003)—e.g., 12%
of women become pregnant because of pressures or
threats from a man (Kero et al., 2001), and men often
have ambivalent feelings about a spouse terminating
a pregnancy (Kero et al., 1999).
Being at risk for HD in itself can cause con-
siderable psychological distress, especially in the
short-term, though not the long-term (Meiser and
Dunn, 2000; Broadstock et al., 2000; Tibben et al.,
1993; Robins-Wahlin et al., 2000). Hence, repro-
ductive decision-making may be affected by such
psychological responses. In general, individuals also
tend to be risk averse (Kahneman and Tversky,
1974; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), and either
seek or avoid information about a medical condition
(Case et al., 2005). Yet, with regard to reproductive
decision-making about HD, the potential applicabil-
ity of these issues, and whether individuals have to
balance these issues, and if so, how have they been
under-explored.
Several critical questions thus remain: In making
reproductive decisions (i.e., concerning childbirth,
prenatal diagnosis, abortion, and pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis) do at-risk individuals who either
have or have not had testing in fact balance respon-
sibility toward others against other factors and con-
cerns, and if so, what other factors are involved, and
how? As a degenerative, autosomal dominant disor-
der with late onset and without effective treatment,
HD no doubt differs from other genetic disorders,
but can provide critical insights into issues that arise.
The present study provides an opportunity to exam-
ine views on decision-making regarding reproductive
issues concerning such a disorder. From a theoret-
ical standpoint, too, Geertz has advocated studying
aspects of individuals’ lives and social situations not
by imposing theoretical structures, but by trying to
understand the individuals’ own experiences, draw-
ing on their own words and perspectives to obtain
a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973). We have used
qualitative methods to explore views and approaches
towards other difficult issues, e.g., concerning repro-
ductive and other ethical dilemmas regarding HIV
(Klitzman, 1997; Klitzman and Bayer, 2003)
METHODS
Sample
Based on initial interviews, we chose to include
3 groups of interviewees: those who had tested and
found they had the mutation and did not have the
mutation, and those who had not tested. We chose
this sampling strategy since these three categories
shaped HD risk (i.e., by showing that the mutation
was present, absent, or unknown), and, based on
prior research, seemed to be important in affecting
how individuals viewed and approached their HD
risk. Thus, we anticipated that this sampling strategy
would provide us some variation in range of partic-
ipants and responses. As summarized in Table I, we
thus interviewed in the end a total of 21 individuals—
8 mutation positive for HD, 4 mutation negative, and
9 not tested—for 2 hours each. Of the 9 women and
12 men interviewed, 1 had less than a high school
education, 3 had a high school education, 2 had at-
tended some college, 8 had completed 4 years of un-
dergraduate studies, and 7 had completed at least
some graduate work. Ten were working profession-
als, 5 were blue-collar workers, 5 were unemployed,
and 1 was a student. Eleven were married, and 9 had
children.
Participants were recruited from an HD clinic
that has a predictive testing program. Individuals
with a clinical diagnosis and at-risk individuals were
approached by clinical staff at the HD Center re-
garding potential participation in the study. Attempts
were made to ask all people who underwent pre-
symptomatic testing, or who were at risk, and their
1st degree relatives if they would participate.
Measures
To understand most fully the range of fac-
tors that may be involved, we used qualitative
methods. With each participant, the PI of this
project conducted a confidential 2-hour in-depth
semi-structured interview concerning experiences of
being at risk for HD and undergoing the process of
testing, and/or learning one’s genetic status. Relevant
sections of the interview guide are attached (see Ap-
pendix A), through which we sought to obtain de-
tailed descriptions of the above issues (Geertz, 1973).
In our methods, we have adapted elements
from Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
Our approach was thus informed by techniques of
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“constant comparison” in which data from different
contexts are compared for similarities and dif-
ferences, to see if they suggest hypotheses. This
technique of “constant comparison” generates new
analytic categories and questions, and checks them
for reasonableness. During the ongoing process of
in-depth interviewing, the researchers constantly
considered how participants resembled or differed
from each other, and the social, cultural and medical
contexts and factors that contributed to differentia-
tion. Grounded theory also involves both deductive
and inductive thinking, building inductively from
the data to an understanding of themes and pat-
terns within the data, and deductively, drawing
on frameworks from prior research and theories.
In conducting thematic content-analyses, we also
triangulated methods, referring to the published
literature, described above.
We drafted the questionnaire, drawing on prior
research we conducted, published literature, and dis-
cussions with clinic staff and others. We then piloted
it, analyzing the results of the interviews, and revising
the interview guide further as we proceeded. Tran-
scriptions and initial analyses of interviews occurred
during the period in which the interviews were be-
ing conducted, enhancing validity, and these analy-
ses helped shape subsequent interviews. Interviews
were conducted at participants’ offices or homes or
in the PI’s office—whichever was more convenient
for participants. The Columbia University Depart-
ment of Psychiatry Institutional Review Board ap-
proved the study, and all participants gave informed
consent.
Analytic Approach
Interviews were conducted until major and mi-
nor themes became clear. Once the full set of in-
terviews were completed, subsequent analyses were
conducted. Analyses were conducted in two phases,
primarily by the PI together with a research assis-
tant (RA) who had social science training. At several
points during the coding process, we also received in-
put from an additional, senior expert in qualitative
research.
In phase I, the PI and the RA independently
examined a subset of interviews to assess factors
that shaped participants’ experiences, identifying
categories of recurrent themes and issues that were
subsequently given codes. The coders assessed
similarities and differences between participants,
examining categories that emerged, ranges of vari-
ation within categories, and variables that may be
involved. The coders developed a coding manual
and examined areas of disagreement until reaching
consensus between them. New themes that did not fit
into the original coding framework were discussed,
and modifications were made in the manual when
deemed appropriate. In phase 2 of the analysis, we
refined and merged subdivided thematic categories
into secondary or sub-codes, when suggested by asso-
ciations, or overlap in the data. Codes and sub-codes
were then used in analysis of all of the interviews.
To ensure coding reliability, 2 coders analyzed all
interviews. We examined areas of disagreement
until consensus was reached through discussion.
Major codes included, for example, discussions of
desires to have children, pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis, abortion, or adoption. Within these core
codes (e.g., wanting children, considering abortion),
we then explored dimensions involved (e.g., reasons
for and against, and external factors involved).
Sub-codes (or sub-themes) included, for example
specific attitudes for or against: having children,
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, abortion, or
adoption.
RESULTS
Individuals at risk for HD wrestled with
reproductive issues, which often proved more
difficult than those concerning genetic privacy
and other areas. As shown on Table II and de-
scribed more fully below, individuals struggled
with a series of questions concerning reproductive
options—whether to have children or not, become
pregnant, and undergo testing, pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis or abortion, and how to make
such decisions. While not an explicit decision-tree
per se, this implicit pattern of choices nonetheless
emerged, with individuals confronting multiple
decision-points, affected by a range of personal
and social considerations. Fig. 1 presents a model
illustrating how patterns of tensions or agreements
could exist concerning these issues among different
sets of factors—individual desires vs. perceived
responsibilities toward spouse, family of origin,
current offspring, future offspring, and/or broader
society.
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Table II. Themes Regarding Reproductive Decision-Making




• Kids as joy
• One could have a good life, even with HD
• Families often support this decision
• Not know about HD in family: not disclosed
• Not acknowledge one’s risk of HD
• Not know HD is genetic
• Pregnancy unplanned
• Denial or avoidance of the issue
• “Taking a gamble”—having children
• “God doesn’t give you something you can’t handle”
• Maybe a cure will be developed
• Spouse wants to
Yet those who ‘gamble’ may face opposition from:
• Outsiders (e.g., health care workers)
• Other family members
No, because:
• Child may be mutation positive
• Parent may not live long enough to raise child fully
Other reproductive options:
Adoption:
• Help a needy child
• Limitations:
• But parent may still die of Huntington’s Disease
• Hard to adopt if HD risk known
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis:
• Limitations
• Not all know about it
• Not all can afford it
• Need to increase knowledge of insurance coverage
Amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (CVS):
• Can be done w/o diagnosing parent
• Questions then arise of whether to abort
Abortion for unplanned pregnancy:
Discussed as hypothetical and real possibilities
Yes:
• If pregnant and fetus is known to be mutation
positive
• If pregnant and fetus and/or mother are at-risk but of
unknown gene status
• Acceptable b/c HD is devastating
No, because:
• Pro-life stance
• Not for humans to decide who shall live
• One can still lead a good life despite being mutation
positive
• Ethical concerns:
• Fears of eugenics, “designer babies”
• Slippery slope: what else will be tested for?
• Having a child commits one to accept the child “no
matter what”
• Against aborting for disease that one has
• Against possibility of self having been aborted
• Against abortion based on HD, even though
pro-choice in general
• Because HD is not ‘that bad’
Views of others’ abortion decisions:
• Abortion as okay for others, but not self
Continued. Themes regarding reproductive decision-making
among individuals at-risk of Huntington’s Disease
• Not passing judgment on others who do so
• Individual rights
• ‘Its up to the individual’ – even if one wouldn’t
undergo abortion oneself, based on HD
Other implications
• As a result of these concerns about reproduction, some
do not even marry
Guilt and blame:
• Some parents feel guilty about having children born who
are at risk
• Some individuals are concerned they would feel guilty
• Even if guilt is ‘illogical’
• Guilt can be overwhelming
• Some parents are blamed
• Future blame feared if prenatal testing and
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis become more common
• Others feel there is no reason for guilt
Reproductive Choices
Having Children
On the one hand, notions of responsibility to-
ward others led many at-risk individuals to oppose
giving birth to children without preventing the pos-
sibility of the child having the mutation. They felt
that they could and should help stop the continued
spread of HD. Moreover, the parent may become
sick, and not live long to be able to help offspring
fully develop. At times, these concerns about dying
and being unable to raise the child as long as possible















Fig. 1. Factors weighed in reproductive decisions.
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My biggest fear then was not, ‘What if I pass this
gene to my child,’ but ‘What if I get sick before he’s
old enough to take care of himself?’. . .[8:F/Asx/NT]
Yet others at risk for HD wanted to have chil-
dren, and/or proceeded to do so, offering several rea-
sons, e.g., their own desires for children, or lack of
knowledge about HD. At times, children were born
at risk for HD because disclosure to the parents by
the children’s grandparents had not taken place—
i.e., family members with knowledge of HD had not
disclosed the HD risk to others in the family. For
example,
It was only three or four years ago that my mother
first mentioned it to my brother and I. My brother
already had a son. [19:F/Sx/NT]
Individuals may know of HD in the family, but
not that it posed a risk to their children. One woman
said she did not know she was at risk of acquiring her
grandfather’s illness.
I’ve never thought not to have kids. . .I never
thought in terms of the disease being hereditary and
my children having the disease. [16:F/Asx/NT]
Decisions to have children may also be dis-
connected from concerns about HD. Individuals re-
flected on past as well as future decisions to have chil-
dren. Some had children after being aware that HD
was a risk, but before fully thinking through and ac-
knowledging it. Denial may play a role here, in part
because of desires to avoid wrestling with the poten-
tial burden of the disease to oneself or others. One
woman said about her brother,
He didn’t know it was genetic. I don’t know how he
didn’t know. How wouldn’t you know it’s genetic?
He says, “If I had known that, I wouldn’t have had
any kids.” [9:F/Asx/NT]
At times, pregnancy occurred unplanned, then
forcing decisions of whether to give birth or abort the
pregnancy.
My brother’s first child was a mistake. It was
their anniversary, and they celebrated, had dinner,
had sex, the condom broke. . .So they spent the
whole night talking about what the hell they should
do. They decided to take a day-after pill. . .Three
months later. . .she’s pregnant—the pill didn’t work.
They had the kid. . .They were worried about having
a child, because [my brother] didn’t know if he was
positive. . .[11:M/Asx/-]
Others had children after weighing the possibil-
ities, consciously “taking the gamble” that the child
would not have the mutation. Children can bring joy
and continue life, and hence can be seen as helping
the extended family, in some ways compensating for
death(s) due to HD.
We decided to go through it and have another baby,
which was the best decision we ever made. . .He’s
just brought a lot of happiness into my family since
my dad died. [8:F/Asx/NT]
Roles of Others
Usually, decisions to have children were made
not unilaterally by one individual, but dyadically as
part of a couple. Additionally, couples often made
these reproductive decisions not in isolation, but with
input from spouses, other family members, health
care workers and others.
However, in each of these multiple sets of in-
teractions, conflicts could ensue. As illustrated in
Fig. 2, even within the domain of “responsibility to-
ward others,” multiple considerations exist and can
compete—e.g., a spouse’s preferences could conflict
with an individual’s sense of the best interests of a
future child. Preferences of other family members
(e.g., a sibling) could clash with those of a spouse.
Input from a health care worker (e.g., that a cure
might be developed) could counter a spouse’s views
or preferences. As suggested below, the outcome
may depend on the nature and strength of each fac-
tor, and other forces involved in a particular indi-
vidual’s decision. At times, children were born be-
cause of conflict between members of a couple, who
disagree in their concern about responsibility toward
others—i.e., future generations. For instance, mem-
bers of a couple could clash about undergoing genetic
testing before having a child. One at-risk woman
said,
I went back and forth with my husband. I kept telling
myself: “I can’t have another baby.”. . .But he said:
we will not have another baby if you’re going to get
tested first. [8:F/Asx/NT]
Her husband’s refusal to permit her to undergo
predictive testing for herself suggests the degree to
which members of a couple may clash about these
reproductive issues. Spouses can either agree or dis-
agree with each other’s preferences concerning hav-
ing children, and may view these issues in very
different ways. One woman’s husband, e.g., would
risk having another child, and felt they should not
be too concerned about potential ethical qualms or
objections.
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Fig. 2. Possible types of competing interests involved in reproductive decision-making.
While I was getting the testing, he was still saying
he would be willing to have another baby without
me going through with it. . .He thinks. . .there’s not
much control of the universe. You have to run a little
rough shod over those kinds of things. You just can’t
live like that. . .[12:F/Asx/-]
In a dyad, power relationships may operate such
that one member may overrule the other, who in turn
may be forced to yield, or consider responding sur-
reptitiously.
He was so adamant! I was going to have myself
tested, and if I came out positive, I was just go-
ing to say: No, we’re not have another one. I don’t
know. . .if I was going to admit I had the test. I never
told my husband this, but I called [my OB]: “Can
I come in for a blood test?” They said, “No. . .You
have to go some other place.” [8:F/Asx/NT]
While she had concerns about these issues, he
did not
At-risk individuals justified decisions to have a
child possibly with the mutation, and responded to
possible objections that they were not acting respon-
sibly toward others. They argued that despite being
at risk of HD, one can still have a good life.
I’ve had a great life and wouldn’t change any-
thing. Even with HD. I don’t regret being
alive. . .[6:M/Sx/ + ]
The possibility that a cure may eventually be de-
veloped can further justify childbirth.
I want to have children. . .If I do have the dis-
ease, hopefully by then there will be. . .treatment.
[10:F/Asx/NT]
At-risk individuals may feel that health care
workers support this possibility of future treatment.
They swear that my children are not going to have
to worry about it—that there’s going to be a cure.
[8:F/Asx/NT]
Health care workers may not actually make this
specific assertion, but often express optimism about
the prospect of future treatment that individuals may
misinterpret or mishear.
Health care workers, too, could affect reproduc-
tive decisions in several ways. As mentioned above,
health care workers could foster notions that treat-
ment will be available in the future, though health
care workers’ reactions could also be negative.
I faced a lot of the judgment. . .There was that aw-
ful moment when the doctor put two and two to-
gether: that we had had our son without having that
test. I saw the look on her face. In a flash, I felt the
full weight of her judgment: That I had done such a
thing. That was excruciating. [12:F/Asx/-]
In part, this woman felt criticized, too, because
of her low self-esteem, and feelings of having de-
served HD. Yet such perceived criticism can engen-
der anger and, possibly, future secrecy.
Finally, I was not telling doctors the truth—I wised
up. [12:F/Asx/-]
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Other Reproductive Options
Adoption
Those opposed to giving birth to a possibly
mutation-positive child faced several options, includ-
ing adoption. Many would adopt, rather than risk
transmitting the gene, but even here, they had to
weigh varying options. Adoption might result from a
sense of responsibility toward others (i.e., unwanted
infants).
“If I test positive, I probably will adopt. . .a
baby. . .that someone else couldn’t take care of. Let’s
figure out what’s better. [3:M/Asx/NT]
She wanted to decide “what’s better”—i.e.,
morally, partly since the parent could still die of HD
before the child reached maturity. Adoption raised
moral questions of how responsible to others to be:
whether the benefits of giving an uncared-for baby a
home for a period of several years outweigh the pos-
sible moral objection that the parent may eventually
become incapacitated and die of HD. Moreover, as a
result of the threat of a parent’s eventual incapacity,
“in certain states they won’t even let you adopt chil-
dren.” [5:M/Asx/ + ]
Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis
As mentioned earlier, in recent years, pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis has become possible,
and a few of those at risk have undergone this pro-
cedure, seeing advantages. Yet limitations arose. A
man with HD said about his sister,
She knows that her kids don’t have the disease. They
take out 10 of her eggs. . .and find 8 that don’t have
the disease, in case she has it. But if she has it, they
don’t tell her. Then they. . .put the eggs back in and
don’t tell her if she has it or not. . .So she knows
her kids don’t have it now, which is great for her.
[18:M/Sx/ + ]
The advantages of this procedure are clear: al-
lowing couples to have children who do not carry
HD mutations, and avoiding informing a parent if he
or she carries the mutation. Not surprisingly, several
said they would consider pre-implantation genetic di-
agnosis if they knew they were positive, in order still
to have kids.
Yet though some individuals were aware of pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis as a result of articles
in the media and film, not everyone knew this possi-
bility existed. Others remained wary, not seeing pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis as a panacea, or even
realistic possibility for them, due to economic, psy-
chological, and possibly physical costs, particularly if
more than one IVF cycle is needed.
. . .I have seen just how tough the in vitro pro-
cess is—physically and psychologically—all the hor-
mones you take. I just didn’t want to go through that.
My sister’s boss tried 3 times and failed. My sister
has witnessed very close-up how emotionally drain-
ing that can be. [11:M/Asx/-]
Moreover, as with childbirth or adoption, a par-
ent with HD may not live as long as he or she would
have otherwise, to raise the child.
Still, despite the limitations, pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis can provide peace of mind—even
if the technological details are not fully understood,
and may even prompt wariness.
It is all like Star Wars to us. But whatever it takes,
the peace of mind is huge. [7:M/Asx/ + ]
Hence, family members and health care workers
may encourage or pressure at-risk individuals to un-
dergo pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, which can
also lead to conflict.
We were actually trying to convince my brother to
do it, but he wouldn’t go. [7:M/Asx/ + ]
Amniocentesis or CVS, and Abortion
Some have had, or would have amniocentesis,
followed by abortion if the fetus were found to have
the mutation. Yet moral concerns often arose and
clashed concerning these procedures. Though desires
for an abortion can reflect responsibility toward a
future child, ensuring that he or she does not have
the mutation, terminating a pregnancy was felt to be
morally problematic and left many uncomfortable.
Some judged that abortion was permissible for a very
serious disease such as HD, but not for many other
disorders.
I wouldn’t recommend it for just any illness. It has
to be something as devastating as HD. [2:M/Sx/NT]
Not all individuals who expressed interest in am-
niocentesis assumed they would necessarily abort a
fetus if it were mutation positive. Though health care
workers presumably only recommend amniocente-
sis or CVS if the patient expresses willingness to
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undergo abortion, at-risk individuals spontaneously
pondered hypothetical questions of whether, if preg-
nant, they would undergo amniocentesis, and abor-
tion, depending on the result. These individuals were
aware that their views might change over time.
I think when I get pregnant, I’m going to test the fe-
tus. But I don’t know if I would want to get an abor-
tion. I don’t know if I’ll be able to do it. [9:F/Asx/NT]
Here, uncertainty remains. Some wanted amnio-
centesis because of desires for information that can
clash with moral concerns.
I’m pro-choice. But I don’t know how I’d deal with
it. Why would God give me a baby that had it?
Am I supposed to just abort it? It’s moral values.
I have nothing against it, if people have to get that
done. Everybody’s got their own situation. . .I’d def-
initely get the fetus tested. Whether I end up having
it, or get an abortion – I don’t know. I would just
feel better if I knew. Maybe so if our child showed
symptoms, he didn’t have to think he was crazy, be-
cause we would know. But at the same time, the only
way we can stop the disease is to not pass it along.
[9:F/Asx/NT]
She remained undecided how she would resolve
this dilemma, balancing innate desire for knowledge
and feelings that the knowledge could help her child,
against public health concerns that reflect broad so-
cial responsibility toward others.
Different sets of responsibilities toward others
can thus compete in these decisions.
Overall, most interviewees opposed aborting a
fetus because of HD. This opposition arose due to
Catholicism, more general moral sensibilities, and
fears of a moral slippery slope. A Catholic, mutation-
positive man said,
You could test embryos and opt for a selective abor-
tion, but I’m really Catholic. It just offends my
sense of morality to decide which embryo lives or
dies. . .I don’t feel like it’s up to me. . .I might adopt.
[4:M/Asx/ + ]
Resistance to abortion because of HD emerged,
too, for the same reason offered in support of having
children despite risk for HD: individuals with HD can
still have full lives before becoming ill.
My brother has HD, but is a beautiful human be-
ing. If my mother had an abortion. . .lot of people
out there would do anything to have 30 good years.
I’m taking care of him. He’s not draining society.
[3:M/Asx/NT]
Yet he implies that the fact that his brother
does not use societal resources plays a role in his
determination, suggesting that if his brother did use
such resources, the moral equation might shift in
favor of abortion. Responsibility to future children
could also clash with broader ethical concerns about
eugenics that may be seen as reflecting “responsi-
bility to others” as well. Even if pro-choice, some
felt they would not undergo pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis or amniocentesis and abortion because of
wariness of eugenics. Many opposed the possibility of
“designer babies,” arguing that rejection of potential
babies on genetic grounds violates something sacred.
In deciding to have a child, one must be prepared and
accept the child no matter what. Childbirth should
not be akin to ordering and returning “commercial
goods.”
“Oh, this person’s going to have leukemia. Throw
him out.” I disagree with that. . .you were willing to
take that risk by having a baby. You could die hav-
ing a baby. If that baby is sick, you have it. That’s
the decision you gotta make up front. It’s not like
ordering a meal: you don’t like it, send it back to
the kitchen. . .It’s not like buying a pair of pants.
“. . .Please send it back and get something else.” You
have to accept what is given to you, and make the
best of it. [3:M/Asx/NT]
“Responsibility toward others” can thus be de-
fined in broad social and moral terms, as dictating
that one accept one’s child no matter what. Hence,
notions of responsibility towards others are inter-
preted in various ways and could in fact clash. Other
factors or considerations are then involved in, and
can sway, decisions.
These moral dilemmas are often decided on in-
stinctual grounds of whether “it sits right” or literally
causes visceral upset. Opposition to abortion arose,
too, due to the fact that one could oneself have been
aborted.
. . .Just because I’m at risk for HD doesn’t mean I
shouldn’t have been born. What if my parents had
detected it before they had kids?. . .[8:F/Asx/NT]
Many of these individuals tended not to follow
intellectual principles against abortion, but to draw
on visceral moral feelings. They did not rigidly follow
dictates, but considered the circumstances, weighing
various competing factors.
Abortion for HD just doesn’t sit right with me.
Not because the Church says abortion is wrong. I’m
somewhat moral. It’s just not right. I’m not against
abortion. A woman has a choice; but the choice
is made based on her ability to provide for the
child. Maybe she was raped and can’t have a child.
[3:M/Asx/NT]
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Principles of autonomy (i.e., the right to make
one’s own abortion choices) could also conflict with
notions of responsibility toward others. Many distin-
guished between their own reluctance to undergo an
abortion vs. a legal prohibition against anyone being
able to do so. These individuals would choose not to
have an abortion themselves, but thought that others
should be allowed to make their own choices, except
for purposes of eugenics.
. . .With abortion, I’m definitely pro-choice, but I
personally would have trouble with that. . .It would
feel immoral to me. [11:M/Asx/-]
He was pro-choice for others, but to abort a fetus
himself felt morally wrong. Hence, as an alternative,
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis appealed to him.
Guilt and Blame
Conflicts arose concerning not only future re-
productive decisions, but past ones as well. However,
since it was too late to change what had already hap-
pened, guilt and blame could ensue. One’s sense of
responsibility can also change over time, as symp-
toms or new technologies developed. Often, those
who had had children without testing now felt guilty
about having done so, even though the children re-
mained of unknown gene status.
My sister has three boys, and got HD. But she says
that if she knew then what she knows now, she would
have gotten the test, and had an abortion, because
she says, “I can’t stand to pass this along to anybody
else.” She feels guilty. . .But there’s nothing she can
do. [9:F/Asx/NT]
Indeed, one’s first reactions to being diagnosed
may be fears and regrets about the implied possible
risk to offspring.
I have a daughter. I don’t know if she has it or
not. But I felt guilty that there was a possibility.
[20:M/Sx/ + ]
Fear of possible guilt in the future if they had
kids led many to avoid having children at all.
I don’t think we could have lived with the guilt if
we knew that we were at risk, and had kids anyway.
[7:M/Asx/ + ]
Still, uncertainty hovered as to how future gen-
erations would view individuals’ present decisions
and the fact that tests now existed, but might not be
used. Potentially in the future, children could blame
parents for not preventing transmission of the gene—
which deterred some from having children.
It would be great to have kids, but if I had kids, I
would want them to be happy to have been born.
[4:M/Asx/ + ]
The guilt of having unwittingly transmitted the
disease to one’s offspring can be overwhelming. As
one woman said about her father,
When they told him it was genetic, he
couldn’t live with that. He lost all interest in
living. . .[7:M/Asx/ + ]
Questions arose of whether one should feel guilt
about passing the mutation on to one’s children. Yet
such guilt could persist even when it was seen as
irrational.
It may not be logical, but: I’m the reason my daugh-
ter may have HD. . .Maybe “logical” isn’t the right
word. Maybe you can say it’s not my fault, in that
the testing was not available. . .But I still feel guilty.
[20:M/Sx/ + ]
Yet others felt that such possible transmission
of genes was blameless, since tests were still new—
unavailable until relatively recently. Some felt that to
blame parents was absurd, since the transmission of
many genetic predispositions—good and bad—was
inevitable. Hence, one should neither blame parents
nor feel responsible for passing on the mutation.
I’m not going to blame my dad. . .Everybody’s got
something. . .there’s a lot of other good stuff that
he gave me. . .even though my life’s been a little
rough. . .I still like my life—who I am. [9:F/Asx/NT]
Still, concerns arose about how one’s offspring
might view one’s decisions in the future.
Abstinence from Reproduction and/or Marriage
The fact that marriage is linked to having chil-
dren may contribute to some individuals with the
HD mutation avoiding serious relationships. They
felt that they should not burden a spouse with po-
tentially limited abilities to have or raise offspring. In
part as a result, some individuals with the mutation
avoided longer-term commitments.
Weighing these Issues
These competing moral factors and their impli-
cations proved difficult to resolve. The complexities
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and conflicts involved generated uncertainty. Some
simply decided that whether they got pregnant and
had a child was God’s will—not theirs.
I don’t think God gives you anything you can’t han-
dle. That’s why I don’t know if I could deal with an
abortion—because why would He give me a baby
that has HD if I can’t handle it? It’s just too much
to think about. [9:F/Asx/NT]
Given the complexity of these issues, the feeling
that what happens is “all in God’s hands” can offer
comfort. In part, for God to give this woman a prob-
lem she could not handle would suggest that He was
punishing her—an idea that was anathema to her.
One’s own moral intuition can compete with
larger political beliefs. A sense of broader social re-
sponsibility can lead to opposition to having a child
with the mutation, because of the eventual burden to
society.
It seems unfair to ask people to forgo childbear-
ing, but at the same time, you’re burdening society
with people that are going to get sick. Maybe they
won’t get sick. Maybe the children won’t have it.
[13:M/Asx/-]
Interviewees generally felt ill-equipped to com-
ment adequately on the larger political and policy is-
sues.
I’m not the right person to answer those questions.
It’s a little too big. [13:M/Asx/-]
CONCLUSIONS
Individuals at risk for HD faced a difficult series
of choices concerning reproductive decisions, balanc-
ing personal and various moral factors. Many indi-
viduals confronted dilemmas of whether to: get preg-
nant and deliver, have fetal testing and either abort
or not if the fetus is positive, have pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis, adopt, or have no children. In mak-
ing these decisions, individuals weighed numerous,
often competing, desires and concerns. While Down-
ing (2005) presented 3 cases and emphasized respon-
sibility toward others as a defining theme, the present
data, reporting on a larger number of interviews, re-
veal other issues, suggesting numerous complexities
and conflicts involved. These data shed important
light on the role of this one factor (i.e., sense of re-
sponsibility) in relation to other variables—how it of-
ten consisted of multiple conflicting notions that in-
dividuals had to weigh against both each other, and
additional competing factors. Individuals had to bal-
ance their own needs and desires (e.g., for children)
vs. those of spouses vs. larger ethical and moral is-
sues. Broader moral concerns and perceptions of the
best interests of current or future offspring can com-
pete. Thus, difficult questions arose of how much and
to whom to feel responsible vs. broader perceived im-
peratives to end the disease or follow religious and/or
moral dictates (e.g., about abortion). While Downing
(2005) presented a schematic “model of responsibil-
ity” that included several stages (e.g., “establish self
as responsible decision-maker”), the data here high-
light tensions that may be involved in such determi-
nations and stages: others’ perceptions of an individ-
ual’s responsibilities may differ from that of the in-
dividual him or herself and conflicts can ensue and
persist.
Not surprisingly, over time with each pregnancy,
some individuals here were uncertain and/or changed
their perspectives and decisions (e.g., “taking the
gamble” with a first pregnancy, but subsequently be-
ing more cautious, using pre-implantation genetic di-
agnosis, or avoiding other pregnancies altogether).
Family members often also voiced preferences
and pressured individuals about these reproductive
issues.
Though pro-choice in general, many individu-
als would not undergo abortions themselves, and had
qualms about aborting a fetus because it had the HD
mutation. Prevention of HD was viewed as a morally
insufficient and unacceptable rationale for abortion.
Thus, varying notions of social and moral responsibil-
ity led to different pro-choice stances that were not
necessarily unequivocally pro-choice, but depended
on the reasons and situations involved. Many women
were pro-choice but anti-eugenics, suggesting that
social concerns about eugenics could outweigh feel-
ings about autonomy and rights to individual choice,
because of the social implications involved. Indeed,
women undergoing abortions have been found to un-
dergo complex emotions related to age, beliefs about
the fetus, socio-economic status, self-efficacy, guilt,
and blame (Coleman et al., 2005).
As suggested by the Health Belief Model, indi-
viduals do indeed weigh pros and cons concerning
their decisions, but, importantly, many factors (e.g.,
moral values about eugenics, and current and future
children) also enter into these decisions. While the
Health Belief Model is largely a rational decision
model, these data highlight emotional, moral, uncon-
scious, and imagined factors as well. Whether indi-
viduals here seek or avoid information (e.g., through
amniocentesis or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis)
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appears tempered by a range of other intra- and
inter-personal factors. Despite Stages of Change
models, although an individual’s earlier reproductive
decisions (e.g., about pregnancies) may affect later
ones, sexual behavior is not always planned, and re-
productive decisions are often dyadic, not unilateral.
Thus, these data highlight, the limitations of some
of these theoretical models, and the need for devel-
oping appropriately nuanced frameworks for under-
standing these complex, multi-faceted issues.
In making decisions about conflicting underlying
ethical issues, complicated ethical dilemmas rarely
involve “good vs. evil,” but more often, weighing
competing ethical goods (Hundert, 1987). Individu-
als have to balance responsibilities toward others vs.
their own needs. Additionally, an individual’s beliefs
and principles can conflict and compete, rather than
be clear. Individuals also often had difficulty knowing
how to resolve these dilemmas and make decisions.
Given that these dilemmas are complex (e.g., requir-
ing weighing of desires for children against possi-
ble future guilt), at times these choices may not be
consciously “decided.” Rather, some pregnancies oc-
curred without planning, or before HD risks were
known or fully acknowledged. Unconscious psycho-
logical defenses such as denial may play important
roles in these outcomes. When couples disagree, de-
cisions may be deferred, one party may prevail, or a
compromise may be reached. Notions of responsibil-
ity toward others are in part subjective, involving in-
terpretation and application of moral principles that
can vary. Thus, though Downing (2005) suggests that
individuals present themselves as acting responsibly,
more complex and nuanced questions emerge.
Several specific issues arose concerning pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis—use of which ap-
peared limited by cost, and knowledge of the pro-
cedure’s existence. The fact that not all at-risk
individuals knew about pre-implantation genetic di-
agnosis underlines the need for more education
about this option. Yet understanding of repro-
ductive and genetic technologies can be difficult.
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis also remains con-
troversial, and along with other reproductive tech-
nologies (e.g., abortion and stem cell research) has
generated intense political debate, fueled in part
by fears, and religious and moral objections. Pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis has been outlawed
or strictly regulated in several European countries
(Robertson, 2005), and is controversial in the U.S.
as well (Healy, 2003). Concerns arose in these
data that in the future, if pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis use spreads, norms may change, such that
its use becomes expected. Some parents wondered if
they would be blamed for not using this procedure
and then having mutation–positive children. Thus, in
coming decades, individuals born with the HD mu-
tation (i.e., for whom pre-implantation genetic diag-
nosis was not performed) may encounter increased
stigma.
Though thoughts arose of testing a fetus with-
out undergoing abortion, clinicians would presum-
ably oppose such prenatal testing if parents would
not agree in advance to terminate the pregnancy.
Parents’ right to know a fetus’ gene status for its own
sake has no clear medical benefit, and the knowl-
edge might in fact affect parental upbringing in ways
that could harm the child. In upcoming years as more
genetic tests become available, patterns and reasons
concerning abortions may also change. Among multi-
ple reasons to seek abortion, women have commonly
cited wanting to postpone or stop childbearing, and
socioeconomic factors, and only 13% in the US in
1987 and 7% in Australia in 1992 cited possibility of
a fetal defect (Bankole et al., 1998; Sihvo et al., 2003).
The present data have important implications
for health care workers. Providers need to be as
aware as possible of how reproductive decisions are
viewed and made within the complexities of couple
dyads. Most doctors would like to be involved in
post-test counseling and support (Thomassen et al.,
1993), but may not in fact have the training or ex-
pertise to do so. Health care workers need to be able
to raise and address these topics with patients and
couples as part of medical care, and learn how to do
so. Currently, health care workers may work closely
with only the one at-risk individual, yet spouses may
agree or disagree about these reproductive choices,
posing dilemmas of how health care workers should
address and mediate spousal conflict. If a husband
insists that an at-risk spouse not get tested before
becoming pregnant, should the staff intervene, and
support the at-risk individual’s insistence on get-
ting tested first? If the disagreement persists, does
the woman and/or the at-risk individual have more
decision-making power, or should the decision be en-
tirely mutual within the couple?
Though the principle of autonomy can dic-
tate that these choices be left wholly up to the
individual, questions arose of whether health care
workers have—or feel they have—any ethical obli-
gations in these decision-making processes, and if so
what. Dilemmas emerge of whether, when, how, and
to what degree health care workers should inform
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at-risk individuals, or encourage them to consider
these various options. Arguably, genetic counselors
and other health care workers should ensure that at-
risk individuals are as aware as possible of the exis-
tence and availability of pre-implantation genetic di-
agnosis.
More psychosocial services may help at-risk in-
dividuals confront these difficult choices. The fact
that these quandaries can hamper at-risk individu-
als in entering or maintaining committed relation-
ships further underscores needs for psychotherapeu-
tic services to help in confronting these issues and
the potential effects of gene status on self-esteem,
and appropriate decision-making. Indeed, these find-
ings suggest that couples therapy may often be help-
ful in not only genetic testing decisions, as Richards
and Williams’ (2004) recommended, but reproduc-
tive decision-making about HD as well. Health care
workers may tend to work with at-risk individu-
als concerning whether or not to undergo genetic
testing—but not how to make reproductive decisions.
The Huntington’s Disease Society of America advo-
cates a team approach, but it is not clear how these is-
sues in fact get addressed: by whom, when, how well,
and to what degree.
Further research is important to understand
these patterns of dyadic decision-making, the fac-
tors involved, the knowledge and comfort of at-risk
individuals, medical trainees and health care work-
ers concerning these technologies, the training of ge-
netic counselors and other health care workers to
handle these complex psychological issues (e.g., de-
nial and avoidance), the degree to which genetic
counselors and other health care workers become
involved in these complex aspects of reproductive
decision-making, the ways health care workers do
and should approach these conflicts and best work
with both members of a disagreeing couple, and
whether and in what ways health care workers would
benefit from additional training. Future investiga-
tions can explore, too, the rates at which differing at-
titudes prevail, and possible differences in decision-
making based on clients’ gender; risk status of the
woman, and other factors.
This study has several potential limitations.
These individuals are involved with a tertiary care
center, yet provided key insights into responses to-
ward HD by parents, siblings, and extended relatives
elsewhere, too. We were unable to test statistically
relationships regarding gender, ethnicity, socioeco-
nomic status, testing, and symptom status. However,
overall, these data reveal several suggestive and im-
portant themes that can be pursued further in future
research with larger samples. We interviewed partic-
ipants at one point in time only, but they described
their past as well as present history of HD-related
experiences. These data also appear to have a certain
face validity.
Importantly, these data have several policy im-
plications. The fact that those with HD may face
obstacles in being able to adopt children poses crit-
ical policy concerns. The 1994 Federal Uniform
Adoption Act provided some general guiding prin-
ciples (Uniform Adoption Act, 1994), but grey ar-
eas exist in how agencies evaluate the “physical
and mental health” of prospective parents. Anec-
dotally, at least some adoption agency application
forms inquire about genetic disease in the family.
Future research needs to assess variations among
application forms and specific criteria of adoptions
agencies.
Increasingly over time these issues will be crit-
ical as more genetic tests become available, includ-
ing tests for incompletely penetrant diseases and ge-
netic modifiers that are normal variants that might
influence treatment responses or disease progress.
How genetic counselors and health care workers as a
whole currently face these issues remains unknown,
but heightened training and research can help in
preparing genetic counselors, other health care work-
ers, and at-risk individuals to confront these com-
plexities as optimally as possible.
APPENDIX. A. Sample Questions
from Semi-Structured Interview Guide
• When did you learn that you were at risk of
HD, and what was your reaction to it at that
time?
• How do you feel about being at risk of HD?
• Have you had genetic testing done?
• If so, what was the result, and how did you
respond?
• How did you decide whether to have genetic
testing done or not?
• How has being at risk for HD affected you?
• Do you have children? If so, how many?
• How have you made decisions about having
children?
• Has HD affected your decisions to have
children in any way? If so, how?
• Has HD affected decisions by other members
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of your family about having children? If so,
how?
• Do you have any other thoughts about these
issues?
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